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Confronting Technological 
and Tactical Change 
Allied Anti-Sub111arine Warfare in the 
Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic 
Douglas M. McLean 
T he recall of German U-boat wolfpacks from the central north Atlantic at the end of May 
1943 ended the most costly phase of the shipping 
war for the Allies. Never again would the German 
U -boats inflict dangerously high shipping losses. 1 
The naval war remained bitter. nonetheless. for 
the U-boats refused to give up. turning instead 
to new technology and new tactics. Right to the 
end, they continued to present a plausible threat 
that caused concern in high Allied circles. Indeed, 
in January 1945 the First Sea Lord of the 
Admiralty was moved to warn that. "The high 
shipping losses which may occur during the first 
half of 1945 may well prejudice the maintenance 
of our forces in Europe .... "2 
The ensuing struggle in early 1945 led to a 
confrontation between improvised technological 
improvements and tactical changes by the U-
boats countered by operational and tactical 
adaptation produced in reply by Allied anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) forces. This last phase 
of the battle of the Atlantic was fought out for 
the most part in the confusing and difficult 
shallow waters around the coasts of the United 
Kingdom and off the east coast of Canada, 
moving to the shores of the United States only 
in the last few months of the war. This campaign 
provides insights into how new and unexpected 
initiatives by an enemy could be dealt with even 
when no te~hnological solutions were readily at 
hand. It also illustrates the difficulty that both 
submarine and antisubmarine forces encounter 
when operating in the challenging environment 
of shallow water. 3 
Improvements in Submarine 
Technology 
S omewhat paradoxically, the new challenges to Allied ASW forces in 1944-45 were born 
of their very success in the Spring of 1943. In 
desperation. the Germans adopted new tactics. 
These featured submerged penetration of focal 
areas of trade by individual boats, which then 
waited for targets of opportunity, made sudden 
ambushes. and then immediately executed 
extreme evasive manoeuvres for prolonged 
periods. Unlike the massed "wolfpack" attacks 
against convoys which had been the hallmark of 
U -boat operations in 1942-1943, these so-called 
"static'"1 tactics seldom caused severe losses 
because U-boats spent far more time avoiding 
detection than aggressively seeking opportunities 
to attack. Yet their new success in avoiding 
detection in areas where the Allies had previously 
been able to detect and destroy them caused 
concern in some quarters of the Allied High 
Command. 5 As 1944 drew to a close this 
apprehension grew because it appeared that the 
U-boats were not only mastering the art of 
evading antisubmarine forces but were once 
more becoming effective in their attacks.G 
The new equipment which allowed this 
dramatic change in U-boat tactics was the 
schnorkeJ.7 This was a comparatively simple 
device which provided enough air to allow U-
boats to operate their diesel engines while 
submerged. 8 Little more than a tube about as 
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Sleek type XXI U-boats at Lisahally. Northern Ireland, 1945. U-2582. on the lf(ft. has her sclmorkel mast 
raised. The submarine in the middle is U-2511. the only type XXI to undertake a wartime cruise. 
long as the submarin~·s periscope, the schnorkel 
greatly reduced a U-boat's vulnerability to 
searching Allied forces because its small head 
was far less conspicuous than the submarine's 
conning tower. Moreover, travelling slowly and 
carefully, the U-boat needed to use the schnorkel 
only three to five hours in every twenty-four. 9 
Most U-boat commanders prudently schnorkeled 
at night to avoid visual detection of the smoke 
produced by the submarine's diesel engine. In 
addition, the head of most schnorkels was fitted 
with a detection device that gave warning ofthe 
approach of Allied radars. 10 Since the U-boat was 
already submerged when using its schnorkel, an 
alert crew could usually dive deep and escape 
before an attack could be launched even if an 
Allied radar operator could distinguish the small 
echo of the tube from the random returns 
provided by ocean swells or flotsam and jetsam. 
Schnorkel-equipped U -boats were sent into 
the English Channel during the summer of 1944 
to attack the heavy flow of shipping that 
sustained the Normandy beachhead; their 
commanders learned that they could operate in 
the most heavily defended waters. 11 The Allies 
had anticipated an aggressive response to the 
June 1944 invasion and had prepared a 
comprehensive defence in depth of the ChanneL 
Massed ASW forces devastated U-boats not yet 
equipped with schnorkels (at the time a majority) 
but found schnorkel-equipped submarines a 
24 
frustratingly difficult opponent. 12 Although 
shipping losses remained comparatively light, 
schnorkel-equipped U-boats regularly prowled 
in the vicinity of the shipping routes to the 
beachheads. Even when discovered these 
submarines proved elusive targets, and. in view 
of the immense concentration of ASW forces. 
remarkably few were destroyed. ~~l 
In addition the Allies (thanks to decryption 
of high-level German message traffic, an 
intelligence source known as "Ultra") were 
acutely aware of the possibilities of the new U-
boat designs. 14 The Type XXI and Type XXIII 
boats were the first conventional submarines 
capable of rapid underwater manoeuvring. 15 
Although they could sustain high-speed 
manoeuvres for perhaps only an hour or an hour 
and a half, these submarine were the most 
menacing known at that time. 16 German 
authorities assigned the highest priority to their 
production in July 1943, but the first few only 
became operational as the war ended. 17 The 
potential impact of these vessels on the trans-
Atlantic logistics of the Allied campaign in 
Europe remains one of the most interesting 
subjects for speculation. Fortunately for the 
Allies, however, the war was fought with older, 
Type VII and Type IX. U-boats re-equipped with 
schnorkels and radar detectors. 
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The only area where schnorkel-fitted boats 
could achieve any success was in the coastal 
areas near ports and focal points of shipping. 18 
Although both Allied and German naval officers 
considered in late summer 1944 that a return 
to open-ocean wolfpack operations would be the 
only way in which Allied shipping could be 
interdicted effectively, and though such tactics 
might arguably have been practical using the new 
submarines, 19 the Germans realized that such 
tactics were impossible with the older U-boats. 
The Germans were encouraged by the ability of 
schnorkel-equipped submarines to operate in 
such heavily defended waters as the English 
ChanneF0 , but were acutely aware that simply 
surviving was not enough. Shipping had to be 
destroyed if the apparently inexorable Allied 
advance was to be slowed. and too few ships 
were being sunk. Still. the schnorkel-equipped 
boats had just garnered the greatest success that 
German submarines had enjoyed since the fall 
of 1943. As the summer of 1944 waned, 
Befehlshaber der U-boote (U-Boat 
Headquarters. or BdU) decided that until 
improved types ofU-boats became operational, 
an offensive in coastal areas offered the best 
chance of inflicting losses on the Allies. 21 
Shallow Water Submarine Warfare 
W ith their decision to move into coastal waters using older schnorkel-equipped U-
boats, the Germans created a difficult problem 
for the Allies. Shallow water ASW had been rare 
since early in the war. The Germans had found 
operating in coastal waters without schnorkels 
prohibitively difficult because of constant Allied 
air patrols. 22 In the first half of the war U-boats 
endeavoured so consistently to escape to deep 
water that Allied doctrine prior to the Normandy 
Invasion presumed that after an attack or upon 
being detected. U-boats operating in shallow 
water would head for deep water. The possibility 
that aU-boat might either settle on the bottom 
or move closer inshore was "considered 
unlikely. "2:l 
As it became apparent that the U-boats had 
begun to do exactly that, the Allies discovered 
that shallow water ASW was, for many reasons, 
a particularly demanding art. Sound conditions 
are extremely changeable in shallow water, a 
function of tidal and current variations. The effect 
of the bottom is another factor which can be 
largely ignored in deep water, but not along the 
coast. Rocks and shoals, as well as shipwrecks 
and schools of fish, produce convincingly 
submarine-like echoes. Finally, the effect of fresh 
water from rivers and streams is frequently 
pronounced, and, in combination with 
temperature variations, cause especially dense 
layers to form in the water that so affect the 
propagation of sound as to effectively "blind" the 
sonar of a searching warship. 
Consequently warships acting as close escort 
to convoys rarely detected aU-boat in shallow 
water before the submarine attacked. During this 
stage of the war U-boats often rested on the 
bottom in the vicinity of shipping traffic, rising 
up to fire a torpedo only when alerted by the 
sound of an approaching convoy. Waiting to 
detect convoys passively by their noise did not 
prove adequate, however. and in mid-December 
1944 BdU ordered all U-boats to remain at 
periscope depth during daylight hours so as to 
increase their chance of finding targets visually. 24 
This helped the U-boats somewhat. and the U-
boat's chance of being detected by the escort 
before it attacked remained slight. After firing. 
the submarines usually either made off at slow 
speed just above the bottom. sometimes simply 
drifting with the tide, or rested on the bottom 
until searching forces had moved on. 2s Close 
escort vessels had little chance to destroy a 
submarine employing such snap attacks and, 
since they had to remain with their convoy. could 
rarely stay in the vicinity of an attack long enough 
to conduct the prolonged and methodical search 
necessary to find a bottomed or deep. slow-
moving U-boat. 
Aircraft patrolled coastal waters incessantly 
but rarely spotted schnorkels, and had great 
difficulty attacking even if an aircrew was 
fortunate enough actually to find one. 2 (i New 
sensors such as sonobuoys were being 
introduced, but these were in a primitive stage 
of development. On occasion U -boats were 
detected by sonobuoys and then attacked by air-
dropped homing torpedoes - a very modern 
tactic indeed - but too rarely to have any 
significant impact on the campaignY The main 
effect of ASW aircraft was the caution that their 
pervasive presence induced among most U-boat 
crews. Seldom daring to surface, U-boats 
travelled slowly underwater at a fraction of their 
25 
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surfaced cruising speeds, groping for clues to 
their actual position. 28 Radio communication 
with BdU, which required the submarines to 
surface and exposed them to the efficient Allied 
radio-direction-finding network, became 
extremely intermittent and contributed to a 
growing inability at BdU to follow operations at 
sea.29 Overall, ASW aircraft substantially reduced 
the effectiveness of U-boats at sea, but did not 
neutralize them. More direct measures were 
needed. 
The strategic bombing campaign, for its part, 
succeeded in stopping U-boat production as the 
war drew to a close, and mines laid in the Baltic 
by these aircraft severely hindered the training 
of new U -boat crews. :lO These achievements gave 
promise of causing the entire German submarine 
campaign eventually to wither. but there was little 
that strategic bombers could do to counter the 
hundreds of U-boats that were already 
operational. 
"' American hunter-killer groups had proved 
0) 
9 formidable U-boat killers during 1943 and early 
"!' 
Ol 1944, but rarely encountered German 
~ submarines in the later part of the war. As a 
::J result of rationalization of command structures 
[t and operating areas among the Allies in early 
0 1943, the USN handled the central Atlantic and 
the eastern seaboard of the United States, while 
British and Canadian forces were primarily 
responsible for the north Atlantic. Since by mid-
1944 few U -boats remained in the central 
Atlantic, and not many submarines could reach 
the eastern seaboard when they travelled 
submerged, USN hunter-killer groups seldom 
had any opportunity to show their mettle after 
1943. When U-boats began to penetrate into US 
waters in the last few months of the war, the 
USN demonstrated remarkable adaptability and 
success in countering them. 31 The growing 
strength of the USN as the European war closed 
did allow that navy to "maintain nearly as many 
Left: An unlikely place to find an air force 
photographer! However. a good shot of the dummy 
schnorkel mastfitted to the British training submarine 
HMS Unseen. based at Digby. NS in early 1945. 
Below: A hard targetfor radar or human eye. The 
dummy schnorkel and search periscope of HMS 
Unseen as they appear when the sub is submerged. 
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ships and aircraft in the Canadian zone [the 
waters adjacent to Newfoundland and the 
Canadian coast] as the entire naval and air 
strength normally available to the commander-
in-chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic." 32 
Nevertheless. it was at this late stage a minor 
player, because the main battle against schnorkel 
U -boats was now in the waters around the British 
Isles, the one area still within reach of most U-
boats in the beleaguered German fleet. Almost 
by default, therefore. the main burden of counter-
measures against the coastal campaign by 
schnorkel-equipped U-boats fell toRN and RCN 
"support groups." 
Support Groups 
T he ships of these groups were theoretically well-prepared to deal with the new German 
tactics. They were the best equipped for ASWin 
their respective navies. By this late stage of the 
war, the majority were either frigates or an 
equivalent class of vessels. fitted with the most 
modern weapons and sensors. The role of 
support groups was to find and destroy U-boats 
wherever they operated. 
The idea of a group of escorts whose primary 
role was to counter U-boats was straightforward 
enough. Experiments as early as 1941 had 
indicated how effective such an organisation 
could be.:tl However, it was only when enough 
ships became available to provide close escorts 
for all convoys that support groups were finally 
established in significant numbers. As the battle 
on the North Atlantic convoy routes approached 
its peak in the spring of 1943, the formation of 
five such support groups was one of the major 
initiatives taken that resulted in the crushing 
defeat ofwolfpack attacks. 34 
The Royal Navy most commonly used 
support groups as rapid reinforcements for 
convoys either under attack or expected to come 
under attack. This practise was extremely 
effective as an antidote to wolfpacks, but lost its 
utility as the Germans changed their tactics. USN 
Hunter-Killer Groups, the American equivalent 
of support groups, emphasized the actual 
hunting of U-boats using radio-intelligence. 
These USN groups were enormously successful 
in the summer and fall of 1943. The debate over 
which approach was more strategically and 
tactically sound was a lively one both at the time 
and since. However, the argument was reduced 
to irrelevancy in the face of the new German 
tactics, which largely denied both Anglo-
Canadian and American forces the intelligence 
they required to use these groups in their 
preferred ways. :Js 
The great strength of support and hunter-
killer groups was that because they were not 
preoccupied with protecting convoys they had 
great flexibility. This allowed them to adopt 
procedures which became the foundation of 
eventual Allied success in the contest with 
inshore submarines. Prolonged searches for U-
boats became a staple in their tactical inventory, 
as did extended operations in geographical areas 
where U-boat activity was high. 
During 1944 the number of support groups 
in the North Atlantic grew to 17 RN and 7 RCN.:Hi 
The predominance of the Royal Navy in support 
groups was partly a result of its larger size, but 
it also reflected the greater role the Royal 
Canadian Navy continued to play in the close 
escort of north Atlantic convoys. The reason for 
this inequitable distribution is not clear in the 
records, but it is not unlikely that the RN 
considered close escort a less demanding task 
than operating as a support group, and therefore 
more suited to the RCN's capabilities. 
Most support groups were allocated to 
United Kingdom waters, which senior Canadian 
and British officers appreciated was the critical 
area. This left the Canadian coast inadequately 
protected, but despite the risk the Canadian 
Naval Staff recommended that the five RCN 
support groups under the operational control of 
the RN remain in UK waters "unless there is a 
real need for them. "37 In other words, unless 
intelligence provided clear indication that a large 
number ofU-boats were en route to Canada or 
shipping losses soared. 
Despite the advantage of vastly superior 
numbers, adequate time to search and good 
equipment, support groups found the task of 
locating schnorkel-equipped U-boats in coastal 
waters extremely challenging. The first 
experience these ships had with the new German 
tactics was in the difficult shallow waters of the 
English Channel in the wake of the Normandy 
invasion. One particularly graphic account is 
27 
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provided by Allan Easton, who commanded the 
destroyer HMCS Saskatchewan at the time. On 
7 June 1944, his ship was narrowly missed by 
two German torpedoes, one of which apparently 
exploded prematurely, the other being detonated 
by the anti-acoustic-torpedo decoy deployed after 
the first explosion. While Saskatchewan and the 
three other destroyers in the group saw the U-
boat's periscope several times - sometimes in 
very close proximity- and conducted numerous 
attacks upon it. as well as a similar opponent 
the next day, the only result was, in Easton's 
words, "dead or unconscious cod rising to the 
surface. "~1 H 
Compounding the difficulties faced by these 
ships was the lack of a coherent tactical doctrine. 
Some procedures had been prepared in 
anticipation of the Invasion, and the techniques 
developed to combat U-boats in deep water could 
be applied to some extent in shallow water, but 
it soon became evident that the Germans had 
brought new and mysterious elements to bear 
and a good deal more was required in response. 
The first hints of new German tactics (such 
as resting on the bottom to avoid detection) came 
from prisoners of war rescued from U-boats 
destroyed in the English Channel as the Invasion 
began. The first Allied message discussing this 
change appears to have been promulgated on 
01 July 1944Y9 However, it was not until 25 
August that the first new tactical search plan 
(known as "Scabbard") that dealt with "static" 
tactics was adopted. 40 In other words, it took 
two to three months for the Royal Navy to react 
as an organisation to the German change. 
During this transition period, the ships made 
do as best they could. Old tactics were adapted, 
or improvised plans were worked up within 
individual groups. 41 Although this was far from 
sufficient, the novelty of the situation militated 
against more rapid development of new tactics. 
It was also evident that a number of new tactical 
procedures would have to be developed: 
"Scabbard" was but the first. It must also be 
emphasized that simply promulgating tactical 
procedures was only the first step in actually 
employing new methods; plans must be 
absorbed and practised by all ships before they 
could be effectively employed, and in the best of 
conditions this takes a good deal of time. In the 
event, it would be almost another six months 
28 
after "Scabbard" was first circulated before Allied 
anti-submarine ships began to demonstrate 
notable proficiency in any of the tactical 
techniques and procedures required to defeat 
schnorkel-fitted U-boats. 
A further reason for the somewhat measured 
pace of the Allied response was that, initially, it 
seemed likely that U-boat operations inshore 
were only a passing phase dictated by the 
Normandy Invasion. The limitations that U-boats 
laboured under in shallow water were well 
appreciated, and Allied intelligence considered 
that a return to (potentially) more effective 
wolfpack tactics would ensue once the Germans 
gave up their efforts (largely futile in terms of 
real effect) to interdict shipping through the 
English Channel. 42 As August ended. however. 
and the U -boats fled from the Biscay ports. firmer 
evidence of German intentions came to light. It 
became clear then that U-boats would 
concentrate in the coastal waters around Britain 
and not against mid-ocean convoysY 
The Inshore Battle: 
Tactics and Technology 
T he opening operations of the U-boats in the British littoral were comparatively small in 
scale, mostly because the evacuation of the 
Biscay bases had dislocated the German navy's 
organisation. A handful ofU-boats were sent out 
to what were hoped, albeit more on the basis of 
estimate than solid intelligence, to be the most 
profitable hunting areas. The most successful 
U-boat ofthis period. the U-482, operated in the 
North Channel, the area just north of Ireland 
where shipping from North America had been 
routed since the fall of France. This boat's patrol 
lasted from 16 August until the 26th of 
September, and she claimed three merchantmen, 
one corvette and one rescue ship, taking two of 
her victims only fifteen miles from the Irish coast. 
The success of this bold submariner in these 
waters came as something of a shock to the 
Allies. despite the experiences off Normandy. Not 
only were all the merchantmen in convoy when 
sunk, 44 but the U-boat traversed waters where a 
special effort had been made to detect and 
destroy U-boats on passage. 45 Although U-482 
was the only submarine to achieve significant 
success during this period. her accomplishments 
6
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made it apparent that the Allies had a long way 
to go in countering "static" tactics. 
Command and Tactics 
Yf"'he analysis of U-482's attacks led to a change 
.1 in the command arrangements between 
close escort groups and support groups. 46 
Support groups had always been put under the 
control of the Senior Officer of the close escort 
group of whatever convoy they had been sent to 
support. During the period when convoys at sea 
were the focus of German attacks, this 
arrangement was entirely appropriate; support 
groups, which rarely stayed with any convoy for 
more than a day or two. necessarily had a less 
complete tactical picture than the Senior Officer 
of the close escort."~ With the switch to static 
tactics by U-boats. however. the situation was 
radically altered. Since convoys were no longer 
the focus of a running battle, support groups 
were now tasked to operate in specific 
geographical areas. Convoys were still 
"supported" as they passed through these areas, 
but now the support group's knowledge of the 
peculiarities of a locality were far more important 
than the close escort's familiarity with the 
idiosyncrasies of a convoy. In particular. the 
support group's knowledge of bottom conditions 
and wreck locations in a local vicinity became 
critical. As a result in mid-September 1944 the 
senior officers of support groups were made 
independent of the close escort when operating 
in support of a convoy.'18 
In September 1944 the RN officially 
acknowledged that U-boats would probably 
employ static tactics. From doubting that U -boats 
would ever choose to bottom, the Royal Navy 
had swung almost completely around. In a 
message to all forces under his command 
engaged in the fight against U-boats, Admiral Sir 
Max Horton, Commander-in-Chief Western 
Approaches, put forth the view that, "When a 
ship in convoy is torpedoed in waters where a 
U-boat can bottom it should be assumed that it 
will do so provided immediate scaring tactics 
[i.e. urgent ASW attacks] are adopted."49 Ships 
of the close escort were given detailed new tactics 
as well, which varied depending upon whether a 
support group was present or not. Previously 
developed tactical procedures, "Artichoke" by day 
and "Basin'' by night were adopted for the initial 
reaction by the close escort to a torpedo attack. 
"Artichoke" called for the escorts in the van of 
the convoy to reverse course back through the 
convoy columns en route to the stricken ship. 
Details of "Basin" have not been found, but 
presumably it called for the close escort to 
congregate near the stricken vessel as well. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the 
importance of quick action as soon as there was 
evidence of the presence of aU-boat. Once the 
initial actions were completed, "Scabbard" was 
to be conducted by either a part of the close 
escort or, if one were available. by a support 
group. 50 
The Admiralty summarized the new methods 
in a message in October 1944. This 
recommended stationing escorts astern of the 
convoy so that they could "pounce" upon aU-
boat in the wake of a torpedo attack. The 
synopsis of U-boat intentions in the final 
paragraph accurately outlined the new German 
tactics, and stressed the change from previous 
methods: 
U-boats can now operate inshore and are likely 
to adopt static tactics in place of the mobile 
tactics which we have been used to dealing with. 
Static tactics involve the use of curly and gnat 
torpedoes fired from U-boats which endeavour 
to lie in wait on the course of convoys. When no 
targets are available U-boats are likely to move 
with great caution and charge by snort [i.e. 
schnorkel] mainly by night. On approach of a 
hunting force [the U-boat] will probably bottom 
or may drift with tide near bottom." 
The tactical procedures developed in the late 
summer and early fall of 1944 remained 
essentially unchanged for the remainder of the 
inshore campaign. 52 In practice it was not 
uncommon for standardized tactical procedures 
to be combined or slightly modified as escorts 
reacted to unique situations. The general 
principles in inshore ASW were, however, 
constant: quick reaction and concentration of 
forces in the vicinity of an attack to deter further 
attacks and to destroy the enemy, followed by a 
prolonged hunt by support group ships if the 
enemy, as generally happened, eluded the initial 
response. 
Patrolling geographic areas near shipping 
routes where U -boats might be lurking entailed 
endless hours of repetitious effort, most of it to 
classify the innumerable wrecks and other non-
29 
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HMCS La Hulloise entering port at Liverpool, England, 7 April 1945. La Hulloise. a River-class ji·igat.e. 
worked wilh both Escort Group 16 out oJ Halifax and Escort Group 25 based in Londonderry and Rosyth. 
She was partially credited with the sinking oJ U -1302 in March 1945. 
submarine contacts found in British waters. 
Tactical procedures for these patrols evolved 
with expeiience gained duiing the winter of 1944 I 
45. Essentially there were two choices: either to 
proceed at slow speed so that anti-acoustic-
torpedo decoys were unnecessary and maximum 
asdic [i.e. sonar] effectiveness was assured, or 
to proceed at moderately high speed, searching 
with decoys deployed. The first approach gave a 
relatively high probability of submarine detection 
in the swept water but covered little area, 
produced numerous false contacts, and gave U-
boats some opportunity to evade because of the 
warships' slow speed of advance. The second 
option was less likely to detect aU-boat, but was 
more likely to disturb any submarine present in 
the search zone because of the greater area that 
could be swept. If enough groups were available, 
then a combination of these methods could be 
productive, because U-boats intent on avoiding 
the noisy high-speed groups might be ambushed 
by the slow, stealthy ones. 5 3 However, because 
there were seldom sufficient numbers in one 
place for this ambitious scheme, most groups 
alternated between the two approaches 
depending upon weather and asdic conditions 
and on the amount of time available to linger in 
an area. 
30 
Detection, Classification, and 
Prosecution 
J\ ctually locating a submarine was a serious 
~roblem throughout the campaign. The 
relative number of U -boat detections by asdic in 
the last year of the war was not markedly less 
than it had been in earlier yearsY However, the 
comparative ineffectiveness of other detection 
assets (such as high-frequency direction-finding 
(HF I DF) of radio signals, radar or visual 
sight.ings) because of the almost constant 
submergence ofU-boats meant that reliance on 
asdic was far greater. With only one effective 
sensor, the total number of detections dropped 
dramatically. Initially, this led to grave concern 
in some quarters that asdic did not work in 
shallow water. The truth was more complex. 
Asdic was somewhat less effective in shallow 
water because of the number of non-submarine 
contacts that confused operations there, but 
there were also areas in both deep and shallow 
water where U-boats could operate with relative 
impunity due to hydrographic factors. The issue 
in both deep and shallow water was initial 
detection, and the Second World War asdic was 
a poor sensor for this role (now known as 
surveillance) because of its extremely limited 
8
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range. The overall problem was not so much with 
asdic itself as that there were so few other 
detection opportunities to complement asdic 
searches - between mid -1941 and mid -1944 
most boats had first been detected when 
surfaced, either by radar or visually. "5 
Once an asdic contact was gained, the 
problem quickly became (as it is today) one of 
classification- that is, deciding whether or not 
the contact was a submarine. Contacts that 
seemed convincingly like submarines were often 
made. 56 Escorts were advised early in the 
campaign to "plaster" each one. 57 This advice 
was valid but obviously expensive. Not only did 
it result in the expenditure of an enormous 
amount of ordnance, but the time required to 
attack all contacts disrupted searches for real 
U -boats. The repeated detonation of large 
amounts of explosive in the vicinity of the escorts 
also caused wear and strain on the ship's hulls. 
Expeditious classification of bottomed asdic 
contacts became something of a "holy grail," and 
escorts assiduously pursued it. Despite their best 
efforts. all methods remained less than 
satisfactory. 
The size of the target as determined by asdic 
proved to be a rough guide at best. The sound 
quality of the echo returned by a contact was 
similarly equivocal, with many non-submarine 
contacts providing far sharper and clearer echoes 
than the real item. A bottomed contact could be 
identified if the vessel was equipped with an 
appropriate echo sounder, but this technique 
required a highly skilled crew. The Type 761 echo 
sounder provided the best results, especially if 
the vessel was adept enough to pass directly over 
aU-boat in the same direction that the U-boat 
was lying. This produced a trace that showed 
the length, breadth and height of the U-
boat,including the distinctive outline of its 
conning tower. Even this result was not definitive, 
for the waters around the British Isles had 
become the resting place of many wrecked 
submarines. A comparison of the position of the 
contact with a chart of all known wrecks would, 
given precise enough navigation, provide a final 
determination of whether the contact was real 
or not. Nevertheless, even if the wreck chart 
indicated that the boat in question was long dead, 
a good echo sounder trace would warrant a 
cautionary attack. 
Good navigation was essential to reduce the 
number of unnecessary attacks, and ensure that 
escorts remained in contact with targets that 
proved to be a "live" submarine. Because of the 
frequency of non-submarine contacts, it was not 
unknown for escorts to be seduced from a valid 
contact onto a nearby non-submarine contact. 
A veteran of the inshore battle recalled an 
incident in which one "U-boat kept us chasing 
all night, and I am not sure that we did not start 
after one U-boat and finish with another."58 The 
value of an accurate and easy to use radio-
navigation system while searching in such 
difficult waters can scarcely be overstated. In the 
last part of the war such a system, known as 
Gee, became available in the English Channel 
and southern Irish Sea, and many, although not 
all, escorts in support groups were fitted with 
the necessary receivers. Gee allowed escorts to 
differentiate between contacts as close as one 
thousand yards apart, and therefore enabled 
warships to plot wrecks quickly and accurately. 
Groups fitted with this equipment became very 
familiar with the wrecks in their assigned patrol 
areas after an initial period of endless contacts. 
Gee was so valuable that support groups that 
were only partially fitted complained in no 
uncertain terms that more sets were essentiaJ.5n 
Ships also used buoys to assist in their 
prosecution of bottomed contacts. The "dan" 
buoy, a small buoy that could be anchored in a 
specific spot, was the recommended aid. Its 
employment prevented escorts from drifting 
inadvertently away from a contact through being 
either set by tide or blown by wind while the 
contact sat immobile on the bottom. The value 
of such an aid to location in the featureless sea 
was demonstrated on a number of occasions, 
and its use was continually advocated by training 
establishments. 60 
Operational Results 
The lowest point in the campaign occurred in 
December 1944. During that month, U-boats 
torpedoed 11 ships in British waters.rit No U-
boats were sunk in the wake of these attacks, 
and only three U-boats were destroyed by anti-
submarine forces in U.K. coastal waters: two by 
ships and one by aircraft. 52 The total number of 
U-boats lost during the month was 14, but three 
were the result of accidents, three were bombed 
31 
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in harbour, and one was from unknown causes. 
Although the shipping losses to U-boat attack 
were insubstantial in comparison to the vast flow 
of Allied trade now crossing the Atlantic, the 
impotence of anti-submarine forces was evident. 
It was at this point, on 6 January 1945, that the 
First Sea Lord expressed his serious concern 
(quoted above) to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
His worst fear was that the U-boats had mastered 
the difficulties of manoeuvring in shallow waters, 
and were now becoming more aggressive. If this 
were true, and experienced U-boat commanders 
began returning to spread the word that convoys 
could be attacked with relative impunity 
providing proper tactics were employed, the 
number of ships that might be sunk in the near 
future was daunting. Fuelling his anxiety was 
intelligence that powerful new Type XXI and XXIII 
U-boats would soon enter the battle. The 
combination of these grim possibilities led the 
First Sea Lord to suggest that by the spring of 
1945 it was possible that the worst Allied 
shipping losses ofthe war might yet be suffered .53 
It did not happen that way. Only a handful of 
the new U-boats undertook wartime patrols, far 
too few to have any effect or to provide enough 
information to do more than speculate on what 
might have been accomplished. More 
importantly, the support groups began to gain 
the upper hand over the older types ofU-boats. 64 
The turning point came in February. While 11 
merchantmen and three escorts were torpedoed 
around the British Isles, three U-boats were 
destroyed in the wake of their attacks, and, 
significantly, another six fell to patrolling ships 
before they could make any attacks. The 
increasing numbers of U-boats detected and 
destroyed before they could strike was clear 
evidence ofthe growing experience and expertise 
of support groups in shallow water operations. 65 
Coastal Command accounted for two more U-
boats, and one was shared between sea and air 
forcesY6 In short, the destruction of 14 ships 
had cost the U-boat arm 12 submarines - a 
devastating ratio. Nor was that all. Altogether 
the Germans lost 21 U-boats from all causes in 
all areas during February. 
German losses continued to mount as the 
war neared its end. In April U-boats sank ten 
merchantmen and two escorts, but lost ten of 
their number to Allied escorts and six more to 
Coastal Command aircraft. with another one U-
32 
boat kill was shared between the two services. 
The total U-boat losses for April were 55, many 
to bombing raids on German ports or while 
attempting to flee at speed on the surface from 
Germany to Norway as the Reich collapsedY 
The older U-boats could no longer keep up 
the fight. At the end of March and in early April 
U-boats were ordered to move further off shore 
where they would again try to hide in deep 
waters. 68 It was a futile strategy, since it was 
understood that individual U-boats positioned 
well out to sea would sink very few merchantmen. 
The main result of this last measure was that 
fewer encounters took place between U-boats and 
Allied escorts. Those that did were once again 
in deep water. Indeed, the wheel had turned full 
circle. In late April 1945. the Commander-in-
ChiefWestern Approaches reminded his forces 
that anti-submarine action was still possible in 
deep water, and in the event U-boats were 
detected: 
.. .it will be necessary to forget tactics recently 
developed for shallow water operations and 
concentrate on those previously so successful in 
deep waterY' 
In less than a year the U-boats had been 
forced to retire from the last area where they 
could possibly enjoy success. Victory was less 
than total, because U-boats continued to operate 
in the Atlantic right up to the very end. but it 
was far from hollow. The reason for the success 
of Allied anti-submarine forces clearly stems 
from the rapid and effective way in which the 
opponents of the U-boats in this last campaign 
adapted tactically to the challenge presented by 
the new style ofU-boat warfare. The way in which 
these groups were deployed to counter the 
German initiative, as well as trained to deal with 
new tactics, illustrates the effective operational 
flexibility of Allied navies by this late stage of 
the war. Despite these successes. the period of 
adaptation was lengthy enough to cause distinct 
concern in certain circles of the Allied High 
Command. The delay was due partly to the 
requirement to identify and react to the German 
initiative, but it was also a consequence of the 
inherent difficulties of conducting ASW in 
shallow water. Not only did the support groups 
have to become proficient in new tactics, but 
their crews had to become accustomed to the 
much more complex conditions commonly 
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encountered in coastal waters. Only when new 
tactics, training and experience all came together 
were the Allies able to deal with the new 
challenge. That they were successful speaks well 
of their capabilities- that it took more time than 
many thought it should demonstrates the 
problems that even a veteran naval force has in 
adapting to new initiatives by an opponent, and 
to the difficulties of countering submarines in 
coastal waters. 
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